In the paper, we show how the potential signaling properties of trade agreements can explain two notable features of the international trading system. First, many trade agreements involve gradual, rather than immediate, reduction of trade barriers. We demonstrate how gradualism can serve as a mechanism by which countries signal their ability to commit to future liberalization by cooperating with the current round of tariff negotiations. Second, there has been a recent emphasis on regional, as opposed to multilateral, trade liberalization. In this paper, we demonstrate that such preferential trade agreements can actually serve as "building blocks" to multilateral trade negotiations by allowing countries to signal their commitment to trade agreements.
Introduction
In a world of repeated interaction and private information, a country's actions may reveal information about the country's preferences. For example, the decision of whether or not to cooperate with a trade agreement can reveal private information about a country's ability to commit to trade liberalization. In this paper, we demonstrate how countries can signal information about themselves through signing and abiding by trade agreements. We then employ the potential signaling properties of trade agreements to explain two notable features of the international trading system. First, the multilateral trading system under the General Agreement of Trade and Tariffs (GATT) is characterized by the gradual reduction of trade barriers. Indeed, multilateral tariff reductions have been occurring in stages for the past 50 years. Traditional explanations for gradualism (e.g., see Staiger (1995) , Devereux (1997) , and Chisik (1999) ) have focused on the evolution of some state variable as the driving force behind gradualism. 1 Intuitively, the initial round of liberalization leads to some change in the economy (e.g., the number of rent-earning factors, or the extent of irreversible capital investment) that in turn relaxes the self-enforcement constraint of the country and sets the stage for future tariff reductions.
In contrast to this literature, gradualism in our model arises not from the evolution of the economy, but rather from the updating of each country's beliefs about the state of the world. Specifically, we argue that gradual trade liberalization can be interpreted as a signaling device through which countries (by abiding by obligations made in past rounds) can signal their commitment to reciprocal trade liberalization. As countries process these signals and update their beliefs about the (fixed) state of nature, further liberalization can be achieved.
The second feature of the international trading system is the recent emphasis on regional trade liberalization. Indeed, the signing of the Caribbean Basin Initiative in 1982 represented the beginning of a fundamental shift in the conduct of US trade policy. Instead of being based predominantly on GATT multilateralism, the US signaled that it was now willing to consider a regional dimension to its trade relations. This regional approach has seen free trade agreements signed with Israel, Canada and Mexico, along with discussions with other potential partners. This change in US trade policy has led to increased attention on Article XXIV of the GATT, which allows for exceptions to the most favored nation principle. The general view is that the US acted opportunistically in the negotiation of these regional trade agreements (especially in relation to Mexico and Canada) and extracted concessions from its partners for which no reciprocal concession was offered. This has led some to term these regional agreements "safe haven agreements", and the imbalance in concessions is considered the payment necessary for access to the safe haven of the US market. Since a safe haven is only required in situations of uncertainty, it follows that the US has an incentive to ensure that the multilateral trading system exhibits instability. Furthermore, a number of authors have argued that regional trade agreements undermine the ability to reach a multilateral trade agreement. 2 Therefore, the US has exploited article XXIV in that it has received benefits from these countries at a lower "price" than would have been paid in multilateral trade negotiations.
However, the safe haven/insurance interpretation of the regional trade agreements of the 1980s and 1990s is not the only possible explanation of the shift in US trade policy. Another possible view is that, through the negotiation of FTAs the US was able to signal its commitment to the process of liberalization and its willingness to support the multilateral trading system. In support of this view one may point to the attitude that many developing countries held towards the process of multilateralism in the 1970s and early 1980s. At that time, developing countries were increasingly disillusioned by the results that the GATT had delivered, allowing widespread use of nontariff barriers and safeguard measures to the detriment of the developing countries. The discretion with which these measures were used caused the developing countries to doubt the intentions of the industrialized countries in multilateral trade negotiations. The extent of this distrust of the GATT process threatened its continuation as developing countries stalled the initiation of another round of negotiations (see Preeg (1995) ). It may be argued that the negotiation by the US of FTAs in this environment was a demonstration of a commitment to an open trading system, and helped establish the credibility needed to support a new round of negotiations. In this paper, we demonstrate how preferential agreements can serve as a "building block" to multilateral trade negotiations by providing a means by which countries can signal their commitment to trade negotiations. Indeed, we show that some countries might actually prefer signaling such commitment through a regional trade agreement rather than gradual multilateral tariff reductions.
In the following analysis, Section 2 establishes the basic model of multilateral trade agreements in a repeated game setting with perfect information.
In Section 3 we demonstrate how gradualism can serve as a signaling device given private information about each country's type, while Section 4 demonstrates how regional trade agreements can serve as an alternate (and in some cases superior) means of signaling commitment to trade liberalization. Finally, in Section 5 we conclude.
The Model
We consider a four country, symmetric model of trade as in Maggi (1999) , where bilateral relationships are separable (i.e., trade policies in a given bilateral relationship do not affect trade flows in the other bilateral relationships). Thus, it is the case that trade policies do not cause trade diversion and a global agreement will be uniformly preferred to a regional agreement by any subset of countries. We assume that each pair of countries trade two distinct goods that are neither supplied nor demanded by the other countries. Formally, let N = W, X, Y, Z denote the set of countries and N/i the set of countries that does not include i. Then each good can be indexed by a pair (ij) where i ∈ N, j ∈ N and i = j. We assume that country i is endowed with goods (ji), j ∈ N/i, where the endowment of each of these goods has been normalized to one. On the demand side, each country i has demand for goods (ij) and (ji) where j ∈ N/i. Demand functions are symmetrically defined by D(p ij i ) where p ij i is the local price of good ij in country i. 3 Thus, for example, country X is endowed with goods wx, yx and zx, which it exports respectively to countries W , Y and Z. Likewise, country X imports goods xw, xy and xz respectively from countries W , Y and Z.
We assume that countries choose specific import tariffs on their import goods that create a wedge between local prices in the importing and exporting countries. Thus, the local price of ij in country j (the exporter of ij) will be given (provided trade taxes are not prohibitive) by p Given a positive trade volume, world markets will clear (i.e., world demand will equal world supply for each good). From this market clearing condition the local price of the good within the importing country (p ij i (τ ij )) can be derived where ∂p ij i ∂τ ij < 1. Local prices of good ij in the exporting country (p ij j (τ ij )) can then be derived from their respective definitions. From these local prices one can derive expressions for the imports of country i from country j (M ij i ). Finally, governments are assumed to maximize the sum of consumer surplus and producer surplus, net of tax revenue. Thus welfare for country X on its import and export goods respectively is given by: 4
In the absence of an international agreement, each country sets trade taxes on its importing good to maximize national welfare, taking the policy choices of its trading partner as given. Taking the derivatives of (1) with respect to τ xw , τ xy and τ xz , and solving out the first order conditions yields the non-cooperative (Nash) policies for country X:
Thus, when setting policy unilaterally, countries will have an incentive to place restrictions on trade, since the resulting change in the world price shifts some of the distortionary cost of the tariff to the country's trading partners. However, while it is rational for each country to erect trade barriers unilaterally, these cost-shifting incentives lead countries to place greater restrictions on trade than is efficient for global welfare. Thus, countries have an incentive to enter into trade agreements so as to reciprocally lower their trade barriers to efficient levels. Globally efficient trade policies will be set to maximize world welfare (W W +W X +W Y +W Z ). Given the symmetry of the model, we focus on a reciprocal tariff agreements in which countries set a common cooperative trade policy (τ ij = τ c ). Taking the derivative of (1) with respect to τ c and solving out the first order conditions, one derives that globally optimal policies are defined by free trade (i.e., τ c = 0).
Multilateral Trade Negotiations
As the previous section shows, countries can achieve mutual benefits by entering into trade agreements to reciprocally lower tariff barriers. However, each country has an incentive to deviate from these agreements by reverting to non-cooperative policies (τ N ). Thus, to be viable, an agreement must be self-enforcing (i.e., member countries must view cooperation to be in their own best interest). Given repeated interaction, an obvious means of sustaining cooperation is to threaten retaliation for any deviation from the agreement. Indeed, Dixit (1987) , Bagwell and Staiger (1990) and Riezman (1991) show how countries can support low tariffs within a repeated relationship by configuring the tariff agreement so that each country fears that a decision to cheat on the agreement would trigger a costly retaliatory episode in the future.
We follow this previous literature by requiring any trade agreement to be self-enforcing. Thus, assume that the four countries enter into a multilateral agreement in which they set some common cooperative trade policy (i.e., τ ij = τ c ). 5 For analytical simplicity assume that this cooperative policy is supported by a trigger strategy in which countries threaten infinite reversion to the static Nash equilibrium if anyone deviates from the agreement.
First, we analyze the conditions for the multi-lateral agreement to be selfenforcing for country X (given the symmetric nature of the model, similar calculations hold for countries W , Y and Z). The level of welfare in a period of cooperation for country X is defined by:
However, provided that τ c < τ N , each country has an incentive to deviate from these cooperative trade taxes to the unilaterally optimal trade taxes. In this paper, we consider the case where a country deviates against all trading partners. 6 Thus, if country X deviates from the agreement, it will receive a one-period payoff of:
Thus, the one-period gain to deviating from the agreement (Ω) is given by: Ω = W D X − W C X . However, once a country deviates from the agreement, it triggers retaliation (reversion to Nash policies) by the remaining countries. Welfare for country X in a retaliatory period is given by:
Thus, the per-period gain to cooperation (ω) is given by: ω = W C X −W N X . The decision to deviate entails balancing the current gains to deviating from the agreement against the future long-term losses to retaliation. It is direct to derive that each country will cooperate with the agreement if:
The self-enforcement constraint (6) requires that the one-period gain to deviation (Ω) must be less than the discounted value of future cooperation. Note that when countries place great value on the future (high δ) the selfenforcement constraint will not bind (since countries will value highly the future gains to cooperation). However, our interest is in cases where the self-enforcement constraint does bind, a situation characterized by Figure 1 . As Figure 1 shows, the discounted gains to future cooperation ( δ 1−δ ω) are maximized at τ c = 0 and are concave and monotonically decreasing in τ c for τ c < τ N . Likewise, the gains to deviation are minimized at τ c = τ N and are convex and decreasing in τ c for τ c < τ N . Therefore, the range of enforceable tariffs is given by the interval [τ c (δ), τ N ]. Since joint cooperative welfare is monotonically increasing as countries lower their trade barriers to free trade, the "most-cooperative" trade tax will be the smallest non-negative tariff that satisfies the self-enforcement constraint (i.e.,τ c (δ)).
Is should be immediately apparent thatτ c is decreasing in δ. Intuitively, when δ is small, the country does not weigh the future losses from defection heavily and thus low tariffs cannot be supported within the agreement. Thus, the degree of cooperation that can be sustained within an agreement is a function of each country's commitment to the agreement (i.e., each country's discount factor δ).
However, designing a self-enforcing agreement becomes problematic when a country's discount factor (δ) is private information. As can be seen from Figure 1 , if τ c <τ c , then cheating on the agreement will occur, thus triggering infinite retaliation. Alternatively, if τ c >τ c then potential gains to cooperation are not achieved. Note finally from Figure 1 that, if δ is private information, then each country would have an incentive to overstate their discount factor (so as to achieve a lower τ c ) and then deviate from the agreement (since Ω(τ c <τ c ) > δ 1−δ ω(τ c )). It should be apparent from the above analysis that multilateral cooperation could be facilitated if countries have a means of signaling the strength of their commitment to the trade agreement (i.e., their discount factor). Obviously one means of signaling a high discount factor is to sign and abide by the terms of a previous self-enforcing agreement. In the following section, we argue that gradual trade liberalization can play such a signaling role. Intuitively, by abiding by the terms of previous trade rounds, a country can signal its ability to commit to future trade liberalization.
Gradual Trade Liberalization with Private Information
In this section of the paper, we assume that each country's discount factor is private information. There are two types of countries: type I ∈ L, H has discount factor δ I where δ L < δ H . Thus, a type L country is a relatively "impatient" country while a type H country is a relatively "patient" country.
In the first round, Nature chooses each country's type I ∈ L, H where the probability that a country is patient is given by ρ (and thus the probability of a country being impatient is 1 − ρ). On realization of each country's type a multilateral trade agreement is formed, in the first period, which specifies a sequence of symmetric tariffs (τ c < τ N ) to be played in each period and specifies infinite reversion to Nash tariffs for any deviation from this tariff sequence. 7 It should be apparent that if a country were to deviate from the agreement it would play the unilaterally optimal Nash tariff (τ N ).
Thus, each county's strategy reduces to the binary choice of whether to "cooperate" (set τ = τ c ) or "deviate" (set τ = τ N ) from the agreement in each period.
Stationary Trade Agreements
First, assume that the multilateral agreement simply specifies a constant tariff (τ c = τ ) to be played in each time-period (i.e., no gradualism). In the first period (when actions have not yet been observed) each country's beliefs about foreign countries' types are simply equal to the initial probabilities. It is direct to derive the existence of two types of equilibria: pooling equilibria and separating equilibria. In the pooling equilibria, countries of each type play the same strategy. Obviously, one pooling equilibrium consists 7 It is common in the literature to focus on infinite reversion to a Nash equilibrium as the punishment strategy as this approach ensures that the equilibrium of the repeated game is subgame perfect. One could consider alternative subgame-perfect punishment schemes which could generate either a higher (or lower) welfare level W in the punishment phase. However, the severity of the punishment will not affect the main results of this paper.
of infinite Nash play (both types deviating from the agreement). An alternate pooling equilibrium is where each type of country cooperates with the agreement. For this equilibrium to be self-enforcing, it must the case that (6) is satisfied for both patient and impatient countries. Thus, this second pooling equilibrium will be self-enforcing (no country will have an incentive to deviate) if τ c ≥τ c (δ L ) whereτ c (δ L ) is the "most-cooperative" trade tax for impatient countries.
The second type of equilibrium is a separating equilibrium where the two types of countries choose different actions. Thus, assume that patient countries choose to cooperate with the agreement while impatient countries choose to deviate from the agreement. If country X is patient and cooperates with the agreement then with probability ρ 3 each of the other countries would be patient and country X would receive W C X in each period. However with probability 1−ρ 3 some subset of the other countries would be impatient and would play Nash tariffs in the first round, thus triggering the punishment phase. Alternatively, if country X were to cheat on the agreement and play τ N in the first period, then punishment would be triggered with probability one. One can derive that cooperation is self-enforcing for a patient country (i.e., the discounted value of cooperating with the agreement is greater than the discounted value of deviating from the agreement in each time period) if: 8
As before, we assume that countries coordinate over the set of enforceable tariffs to choose the smallest non-negative tariff. We will refer to this "most-cooperative" tariff as τ (δ H , ρ). Assuming that the multi-lateral agreement specifies that τ c = τ (δ H , ρ), it is direct to show that, given δ L < δ H , impatient countries will deviate from the agreement. Thus, our separating equilibrium exists at τ c = τ (δ H , ρ). 9 Second, note that, since ρ < 1, the most-cooperative tariff for patient countries with imperfect information is higher than that with perfect information (τ (δ H , ρ) >τ c (δ H )). This is due to the fact that each country is placing less weight on the discounted value of cooperation since they cannot be certain that the countries in the alternate region will abide by the terms of the agreement (see Figure 2) . Thus, imperfect information about each country's type reduces the degree of cooperation that can be sustained in a self-enforcing agreement.
Gradual Trade Agreements
In the pooling equilibrium, the actions of each country in the first round provide no signal about their type. However, in the separating equilibrium, by cooperating in the first round patient countries have implicitly signaled their type. Thus, if cooperation has occurred in the first-round, in the second round each country can update its beliefs about the other country's type and, in the event that all are patient, sustain a greater degree of cooperation. The approach of setting the same τ c in each period ignores this belief updating that occurs with cooperation. Thus, in the analysis that follows, we explore whether a system of gradual trade liberalization can achieve greater cooperation.
Consider the following multilateral system of "gradual" trade liberalization. Assume that the agreement specifies a symmetric, single-period tariff (τ g < τ N ) in the first-round and the perfect-information, most-cooperative tariffτ c (δ H ) in all subsequent rounds. As before, any deviation from this tariff sequence is punished by infinite reversion to the Nash equilibrium. Thus, the analysis is similar to that in Section 3.1 with the exception that cooperation by all countries in the first round will result in achieving a lower tariff (τ c (δ H )) in all subsequent rounds. One can derive that, in a separating equilibrium, cooperation in the first-round is self-enforcing for a patient country if:
We denote the smallest non-negative tariff that satisfies the above constraint (the most-cooperative first round tariff) asτ g (δ H , ρ). Given δ L < δ H , impatient countries will deviate fromτ g (δ H , ρ) in the first-round and thus the above strategies represent a completely revealing separating equilibrium. Given that cooperation in the first-round is a completely revealing strategy (that δ = δ H ), thenτ c (δ H ) will be self-enforcing in all subsequent periods (given global cooperation in the first round). Thus, our separating equilibrium exists.
Second, it is direct to show thatτ g (δ H , ρ) >τ c (δ H ) (see Figure 2) . Thus, this is implicitly a system of gradual trade liberalization, in which countries progressively lower tariff barriers over time. It is also the case thatτ g (δ H , ρ) < τ (δ, ρ) and thus gradualism results in uniformly lower selfenforcing tariffs (provided countries are "patient") than when countries are constrained to set the same cooperative tariff over time. Intuitively, a system of gradual trade liberalization allows countries to update their beliefs about foreign countries types and thus sustain lower tariffs in the future in the event that cooperation is maintained (since such cooperation signals the ability of countries to commit to trade liberalization). In addition, the promise of lower future tariffs with gradualism relaxes the self-enforcement constraint and allows countries to sustain lower tariffs in the present. Thus, we can derive the first proposition of this paper:
PROPOSITION 1 In a world of private information, gradualism in trade liberalization can arise from the updating of each country's beliefs about the state of the world. In addition, a trade agreement that exhibits gradualism will be welfare superior to a stationary agreement.
Preferential Trade Agreements as Signaling Devices
While one means of signaling one's type is to abide by the terms of a round of multi-lateral negotiations, an alternate means is to sign and cooperate with a regional trade agreement. In this section, we demonstrate how preferential trade agreements can serve as a building block for a future multilateral agreement by providing countries a means of communicating their "commitment" to trade liberalization. In this section, we divide our countries into two regions: East (countries W and X) and West (countries Y and Z). Each country signs a regional trade agreement (with its regional trading partner) which is scheduled to last for one period. On the dissolution of the preferential trade agreement, all four countries sign a multilateral agreement. Both agreements are required to be self-enforcing and we assume that any deviation from either agreement results in infinite reversion to the full Nash equilibrium.
Preferential Agreements and Private Information
In the first round, each region forms a regional trade agreement. The regional trade agreement involves setting a common, low tariff (τ p < τ N ) against one's regional trading partner, while playing Nash tariffs against countries in the opposite region. Conducting the analysis in terms of country X, welfare while cooperating in the preferential agreement is defined by:
However, as in the multilateral agreement, each country will have an incentive to deviate from this preferential trade agreement. When deviating, a country will impose unilaterally optimal trade taxes and the deviating level of welfare is given by:
) Since the regional trade agreements last for only a single period, the only gain to abiding by the terms of the agreement is that it sends a signal about your type to countries in the other region and thus influences the multilateral agreement that is established in subsequent periods. Thus, in this section we are only interested in establishing the existence of a separating equilibrium. As before, assume that patient countries choose to cooperate with the regional agreement while impatient countries choose to deviate from the regional agreement. In that case, if both regions establish and cooperate with the regional agreement, then the multilateral agreement will be able to supportτ c (δ H ) as a self-enforcing equilibrium in all subsequent periods.
First, assume country X is patient. If it cooperates with the agreement, then with probability ρ its regional partner is patient and it receives W P A X in the first period. Such cooperation sends a signal that both countries are patient and (with probability ρ 2 ) the multilateral agreement is established in subsequent periods. Alternatively, if country X were to cheat on the agreement and play τ N in the first period, then with probability ρ it would receive W DP A X in the first period and trigger the punishment phase. One can derive that cooperation is self-enforcing for a patient country if:
This self-enforcement constraint states that the discounted value of abiding by the terms of the preferential agreement must outweigh the discounted value of deviating from the preferential agreement. We will refer to the smallest, non-negative tariff that satisfies the above constraint as the mostcooperative preferential tariff (τ p (δ, ρ)). Once again, if the regional agreement results in setting the most-cooperative preferential tariff for patient countries (τ p (δ H , ρ)), then any impatient country will deviate from the agreement and thus the separating equilibrium is established. Since the preferential trade agreement is only supportable if the country's discount factor is sufficiently high, abiding by the terms of the preferential agreement sends a signal to outside countries that multilateral cooperation can be supported. Thus, preferential agreements serve as a building block to future multilateral liberalization in this model since they serve as an alternate means of signaling commitment to outside countries.
Finally, one can ask whether a patient country would prefer signaling through a system of regional agreements or through a system of gradual trade liberalization. In either system, a patient country will cooperate with the agreement. Thus, assuming that country X is patient, in a system of gradualism the multi-lateral agreement is sustained during the first round with probability ρ 3 (and the patient country receives W C (τ g )). However, with probability (1 − ρ 3 ) some subset of countries deviates from the agreement and the patient country receives W ∼C i (τ g ) where i denotes the number of deviating countries. In a system of regionalism, the regional agreement is sustained with probability ρ in the first-round (resulting in welfare of W P A (τ p )) and is deviated from with probability 1 − ρ (resulting in welfare of W ∼P A (τ p ) for the patient country). Since, in either system, the most-cooperative multi-lateral agreement is achieved with probability ρ 4 , the system of gradualism will be preferred to the system of regionalism by patient countries if:
In the appendix it is shown that this condition is uniformly satisfied for any ρ > 0 and δ > 0. Thus, it is the case that signaling through gradual trade liberalization is superior to signaling through preferential trade liberalization.
Preferential Agreements and Shared Private Information
A recent literature in international economics has emerged which focuses on the importance of information flows within trade relationships. For example, Rauch (1999) suggests that geographical proximity (or colonial ties) might facilitate the exchange of information within trading networks. Likewise, Rauch and Trindade (1999) suggest that immigration patterns and the formation of ethnic networks might affect information flows. Finally, Nicita and Olarreaga (2000) find evidence that information spillovers are geographically concentrated. This literature on networks and information flows raises the possibility that countries might possess relatively greater information about their regional trading partners than about other countries within a multilateral agreement. To model this possibility in the simplest way, we assume that regional trading partners share private information (i.e., countries in a region know their regional partner's discount factor). This assumption proxies for the idea that countries with shared borders or common social or ethnic networks may possess greater information about each other. As in the previous section, we investigate a separating equilibrium in which the patient countries choose to cooperate with the regional agreement while impatient countries choose to deviate from the regional agreement. However, since each country knows its trading partners discount factor, cooperation will only occur with regional partners who are patient. Thus, in the separating equilibrium, a patient country will play a conditional strategy of "cooperation" if its trading partner is patient, and "deviation" if its trading partner is impatient. The impatient country will deviate regardless of its trading partner's type. Thus, assume country X is patient. Cooperation will be self-enforcing for country X if country Y is patient and the gains to deviating from the agreement are less than the discounted gains to cooperation:
As before, if the regional agreement sets the lowest possible tariff (τ p = τ p (δ H , ρ)), then any impatient country will deviate from the agreement and thus the separating equilibrium is established. The question raised in this section is whether a "patient" country would prefer signaling through a system of regional agreements or through a system of gradual trade liberalization given this shared private information. To compare the two systems, we first must solve for the first round tariff (τ g ) in a gradual system given the presence of this shared information. This tariff is defined by the following self-enforcement constraint:
In either system, a patient country will cooperate with the regional or first-round agreement only on the condition that its trading partner is also patient. Thus, assume that both countries in the East region are patient.
Then the gradual multi-lateral agreement is sustained during the first round with probability ρ 2 and is deviated by the foreign countries with probability 1 − ρ 2 . In a system of regionalism, the regional agreement is sustained with probability one (since only sustainable regional agreements are signed). Since, in either system, the most-cooperative multi-lateral agreement is achieved with probability ρ 4 , the system of regionalism will be preferred to the system of gradualism by patient countries if:
In the appendix we show that, if ρ is sufficiently small, then (15) is satisfied and welfare under the preferential trade agreement system will be greater than welfare with gradual multilateral trade liberalization for the patient country. Thus, it is the case that signaling through preferential trade agreements may be superior to signaling through gradual trade liberalization. The reason for this preference is that regional agreements allow countries to exploit their shared information in signaling their type to the outside world. Thus, to the extent that regional countries share private information and multilateral liberalization is sufficiently risky (i.e., the probability of one's multilateral partner being "impatient" is high) then regional agreements will be the preferred means of signaling information. Thus, we can derive the second main proposition of this paper:
PROPOSITION 2 In a world of private information, regional trade agreements can provide a means for a subset of countries to signal their commitment to trade liberalization and thus facilitate future multilateral negotiations. In addition, signaling through regionalism may be preferred to signaling through gradualism when regional trading partners share inside information about one another.
Conclusion
In this paper we analyze the ability of countries to signal private information to their trading partners by entering into and abiding by the terms of a trade agreement. In a very simple model of multilateral trade, we derive two main results. First, we show that signaling can provide an explanation for gradualism in trade liberalization. Intuitively, by committing to partial trade liberalization, countries can signal their type to other countries and thus support a further round of tariff reductions. Second, we show that an alternative (and perhaps welfare superior) means of signaling one's type is to commit to a regional trade agreement.
It should be noted that the actual subject of private information could be anything that affects a country's self-enforcement constraint (in this paper, it was countries' discount factors). For example, in Staiger (1995) , countries could commit to a further round of liberalization on the dissolution of sectorspecific skills with respect to the import sector. However, to the extent that the timing of this dissolution is private information, a country would need some means of signaling this information to its trading partners. Our model suggests that one means of signaling would be through signing and abiding by a regional trade agreement. Likewise, in Chisik (1999) further trade liberalization is possible on the sinking of irreversible investment into trade dependent sectors. Once again, to the extent that this investment is not perfectly observable, regional trade agreements might be one means of signaling this information.
A Appendix

A.1 Welfare comparison under gradualism and regionalism
Recall that the condition required for gradualism to be the preferred approach to signaling a high discount factor is given by (12). To simplify notation, let W xi represent the welfare on the three symmetric import goods and let W ix represent welfare on the three symmetric export goods. Given the separable structure of the model, these welfare measures can be written as:
where K ∈ {1, 2, 3}
Substituting these quantities into (12) gives:
Since, at most-cooperative tariffs (τ g ,τ p ) both self enforcement constraints (8) and (11) bind, it must be the case that:
Note that the left-hand side can be approximated by:
Since
∂W N xi ∂τ = 0 at τ = τ N . Similarly the right hand side can be approximated by:
Using these two approximations gives:
Returning to the condition of interest:
√ 3 3 Hence, signaling through gradualism is the universally preferred approach.
A.2 Welfare comparison under gradualism and regionalism with shared private information
Recall that the condition for a regional system to be preferred is given by (15). As before, let W xi represent welfare on the three symmetric import goods and let W ix represent welfare on the three symmetric export goods. Thus, welfare measures are defined as in Appendix A.1, and substituting into (15) one derives that:
Since both self-enforcement constraints (13) and (14) bind, this condition simplifies to:
Applying a Taylor series expansion to both sides yields:
Using τ p − τ N = √ 3 τ g − τ N gives the following:
A sufficient condition for this to hold is √ 3 > (1 + ρ 2 ). 
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